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The global credit crisis of 2008 has demonstrated beyond any doubt that 
pre-existing international arrangements were insufficient to preserve 
stability in the global financial system, resulting in the most serious global 
economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression. This article 
examines the agenda being pursued through the Group of 20 (G-20), 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and related organizations to reform 
international financial regulation in the wake of the global financial crisis, 
focusing on whether the international regulatory agenda in fact addresses 
the fundamental sources of systemic risk underlying the global crisis. In 
addressing this question, the article begins by suggesting the basic 
elements of a financial regulatory system to effectively address systemic 
risk, arguing that in each case, the global financial crisis has highlighted 
specific failures of the pre-crisis regulatory approach, then provides an 
overview and analysis of international responses to the global financial 
crisis, focusing on the G-20 and FSB. The article concludes, arguing that, 
while much has been achieved to date, the post-crisis international 
regulatory reforms that have been agreed would not have prevented the 
global financial crisis nor are sufficient to lay the foundations for future 
global financial stability. 
[INSERT TOC] 
INTRODUCTION 
The global credit crisis of 2008 has demonstrated beyond any doubt 
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that pre-existing international arrangements were insufficient to preserve 
stability in the global financial system, resulting in the most serious global 
economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression.1 Similar to most 
other official reports and post-crisis analyses, in reviewing the causes of the 
crisis in the United States, the official Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(FCIC) concluded, first, that the crisis was avoidable,2 and second, that the 
crisis was caused by: (1) ―widespread failures in financial regulation and 
supervision‖; 3  (2) ―dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk 
management at many systemically important financial institutions‖;4 (3) ―a 
combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of 
transparency‖; 5  and (4) ―a systemic breakdown in accountability and 
ethics.‖6 In the context of addressing the crisis, the FCIC found the U.S. 
government and regulatory system ―w[ere] ill prepared for the crisis, and 
its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial 
markets.‖7 
While these conclusions focus on the U.S. financial system, they are 
 
 1. There is now a massive and ever-growing literature on the causes of the global financial 
crisis. For the official analysis in the context of the U.S., see U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N 
[FCIC], THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf. For the leading discussion in the U.K. and global context, 
see U.K. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL 
BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. For 
the leading discussion in the E.U. context, see THE HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN 
THE E.U., REPORT (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf. Book-length 
treatments include, inter alia: JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL:  THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC 
CALAMITIES (2009); ROBERT W. KOLB, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME (2011); ANDREW 
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL:  THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON 
FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES (2009); JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(2010); GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE (2009). 
For this author’s analysis of the causes of the crisis, see ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. 
ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS:  THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE 
(forthcoming 2011); Douglas W. Arner, The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and 
Consequences, 43 INT’L LAW. 91 (2009) [hereinafter Arner, Credit Crisis]. 
 2. FCIC, supra note 1, at xvii. 
 3. Id. at xviii. The terms ―regulation‖ and ―supervision‖ are frequently used 
interchangeably in the context of finance. However, in a technical sense, ―regulation‖ refers to the 
actual rules, systems and structures while ―supervision‖ refers to the process of monitoring both 
compliance with ―regulation‖ and also the overall condition of markets and financial market 
participants. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at xix. 
 6. Id. at xxii. 
 7. Id. at xxi. 
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equally applicable to the experiences of the United Kingdom and the 
European Union.8 The financial crisis of 2008 was a global financial crisis 
and one which emanated from the global financial system and from 
international regulatory efforts to address common risks and concerns, 
including financial stability.9 Financial stability, at its most elemental level, 
depends on regulators’ effectively monitoring, preventing, and addressing 
systemic risk,10 and the global financial crisis of 2008 has underlined that 
pre-crisis international financial regulatory approaches were insufficient to 
prevent systemic risk or to maintain the stability of the global financial 
system. Moreover, the crisis has demonstrated the fact that preventing and 
addressing systemic risk is the fundamental aspect of financial regulatory 
design, not only at the domestic level but also in the context of the global 
financial system and the pseudo-system of international regulatory 
cooperation which has evolved to address its regulation. 
This Article examines the agenda being pursued through the Group of 
20 (G-20), Financial Stability Board (FSB) and related organizations to 
reform international financial regulation in the wake of the global financial 
crisis, focusing on whether the international regulatory agenda in fact 
addresses the main sources of systemic risk underlying the global crisis.11 
In other words, in the theme of this Symposium issue, is the post-crisis 
process of adaptation of international financial regulation sufficient to 
support the future resilience of the global financial system? In addressing 
this question, Part II of this Article begins by suggesting the basic elements 
of a financial regulatory system to effectively address systemic risk, 
 
 8. For detailed discussion and similar conclusions, see THE HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. 
SUPERVISION IN THE E.U., supra note 1. 
 9. For a detailed discussion of the pre-crisis international arrangements addressing financial 
stability and their evolution, see DOUGLAS ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
AND THE ROLE OF LAW 63–88 (2007); Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a New 
Design for International Financial Regulation, U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391, 406–20 (2007). 
 10. Systemic risk is defined as: 
the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant 
increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious 
enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy. Systemic 
risk events can be sudden and unexpected, or the likelihood of their occurrence can build 
up through time in the absence of appropriate policy responses. The adverse real 
economic effects from systemic problems are generally seen as arising from disruptions 
to the payment system, to credit flows, and from the destruction of asset values. 
GROUP OF TEN, REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 126 (2001), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf. 
 11. This Article does not consider purely domestic (e.g., U.S.) or regional (e.g., E.U.) 
responses. 
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arguing that in each case, the global financial crisis has highlighted specific 
failures of the pre-crisis regulatory approach.  
In order to assess the central question, Part III provides an overview of 
international responses to the global financial crisis, focusing on the G-20 
and FSB. Despite its seeming ambition, it remains open to debate whether 
the G-20 / FSB response to date, if implemented prior to the global 
financial crisis, would have in fact been sufficient to prevent its 
occurrence—arguably the central policy objective at this point in time.12 
With this overall objective in mind, Part IV turns to the issues where 
arguably the greatest success has been achievedregulation and 
infrastructure. Parts V and VI then discuss areas where arguably less has 
been achieved, notably macroprudential regulation, regulatory system 
design, addressing systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 
financial institution resolution. The Article then concludes, arguing that, 
while much has been achieved to date, the post-crisis international 
regulatory reforms that have been agreed to date would not have prevented 
the global financial crisis nor are sufficient to lay the foundations for future 
global financial stability. 
I.  FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
In this author’s opinion, designing a regulatory system to address 
systemic risk requires addressing seven core elements.13 First, the system 
must ensure the existence of a robust financial infrastructure, especially 
payment and settlement systems. Financial infrastructure is the essential 
―plumbing‖ of any financial system and must be regulated to maintain 
stability and effectiveness. Second, the regulatory system should support 
the existence of well-managed financial institutions with effective 
corporate governance and risk management systems. While regulation 
cannot and should not prevent the failure of financial institutions, it still 
must provide ground rules and incentives to improve management when 
possible. Third, financial markets require information; regulation should 
thus provide disclosure requirements for financial institutions, markets, and 
products sufficient to support market discipline and address information 
asymmetries which may have negative implications for market functioning 
 
 12. International efforts need to be forward looking as well and should be seeking to put in 
place arrangements to address the next crisis, rather than simply addressing the failures relating to 
the last crisis. However, this Article argues that international efforts have not yet even dealt with 
the issues raised by the last crisis, let alone addressed issues relating to future crises. 
 13. This framework is derived from ARNER, supra note 9, at 317–19, 322–35. 
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and confidence. At the same time, disclosure requirements should be 
sufficient to provide regulators with comprehensive information not only 
about individual financial institutions and products (―microprudential 
regulation‖), but also about interlinkages across markets, institutions, and 
products (―macroprudential regulation‖). Fourth, in addition to reinforcing 
risk management and market discipline, the regulatory system should 
provide minimum requirements for safety and soundness of individual 
financial institutions, markets, and essential infrastructureswhat it 
traditionally known as ―prudential regulation.‖ These four elements seek to 
address prevention of systemic financial crises and at the same time 
establish the primary regulatory elements supporting the effective 
functioning of any financial system. 
At the same time, a system needs to be able to address crises when 
they occur. The final three elements thus seek to establish a minimum 
regulatory framework for such circumstances. First, there should be a 
liquidity provider (or lender) of last resort to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions and markets on an appropriate basis. This role is typically filled 
by the central bank of a given monetary system. Second, in order to address 
the possibility of financial institution failure, there should be mechanisms 
for resolving problematic financial institutions, including insolvency 
arrangements. Finally, there must be mechanisms to protect financial 
services consumers in order to maintain market confidence, including in the 
event of financial institution failure. 
While this framework applies to the design of any domestic or 
regional financial system in addressing systemic risk, in the context of a 
globalized financial system, these issues cannot be addressed solely in 
individual jurisdictions but require global coordination and cooperation. 
Global coordination is necessary not only to assure high regulatory 
standards but also to ensure a level playing field across jurisdictions. In the 
global financial crisis, regulatory weaknesses in each of these areas 
combined both in allowing excesses to develop and in making their 
resolution extremely difficult. 
First, in relation to infrastructure, the central weakness exposed by the 
crisis has been in relation to the current bilateral structure of over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives markets. In this structure, OTC derivatives 
transactions are organized on a bilateral contractual basis, generally 
supported by collateral, without central trading or clearing, resulting in 
exposure to risks of counterparty failure, in addition to any risks associated 
with the transaction itself. In addition, the bilateral OTC structure 
minimized transparency, both to participants and to regulators, increasing 
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risks of loss of confidence and contagion across products, institutions and 
markets. These issues were exposed most directly in the context of the 
Lehman Brothers and AIG.  
Second, in relation to corporate governance, it has become evident 
that many financial institutions failed to adequately manage their own risks 
or businesses prior to the global financial crisis.14 This is certainly one of 
the central failures in the global financial crisis. 
Third, disclosure requirements did not sufficiently support 
transparency and market discipline. In fact, systemic risks arose due to 
asymmetric information—essentially, weaknesses in transparency and 
disclosure.15 Such issues are characteristic of the highly complex structured 
products, which acted as the transmission mechanism of the excesses 
preceding the crisis and led to adverse selection issues during the crisis. 
The reliance on credit ratings and credit rating agencies exacerbated such 
issues both prior to and during the crisis.16 In this respect, transparency is 
fundamental not only to stability, but also to effective market functioning 
and should be a continuing major focus. 
Fourth, in relation to prudential regulation, in most cases, systemic 
risk did not arise from areas which were the subject of regulatory 
responsibility. Instead, risks arose primarily from areas which were largely 
unregulated; these practices are now described as ―shadow banking.‖ 17 
Examples include mortgage broker activities, off-balance-sheet activities of 
banks, thrifts and securities firms, OTC derivatives, and non-traditional 
activities of insurance companies. In these cases, risks often arose from 
regulatory arbitrage as financial firms actively moved activities outside of 
regulated areas.18 Such regulatory arbitrage was also in many cases made 
possible by the splintering of financial regulation in the United States 
 
 14. FCIC, supra note 1, at xix. 
 15. See id. at xixxx. 
 16. See, e.g., Paul Lejot et al., Securitization in East Asia 32 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working 
Paper Series on Reg’l Econ. Integration No. 12, 2008), available at 
http://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP12_Securitization_in_East_Asia.pdf (―Periods of market 
disruption tend to include calls for [credit] rating agency reform based upon the observation that 
they often fail to predict imminent credit problems.‖). 
 17. See generally Z. POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORTS NO. 458: 
SHADOW BANKING (Jul. 2010), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf (discussing shadow banks and their 
role in the U.S. economy and their relationship with traditional, central-bank-backed banks); 
Financial Stability Board, Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues – A Background Note of the 
Financial Stability Board (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf. 
 18. FCIC, supra note 1, at xx. 
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across a large number of regulators, with individual regulators usually less 
concerned about activities falling outside of the scope of their major 
responsibilities. 19  In addition, systemic risks arose due to improperly 
designed prudential regulatory standards, especially in relation to capital, 
liquidity, and leverage. In this respect, appropriate coverage of regulation is 
an essential focus, especially with regard to improving the quality, quantity, 
and international consistency of capital, including regulation to prevent 
excessive leverage and requiring buffers of resources to be built up in good 
times. 
Fifth, in relation to liquidity, resolution, and consumer protection, 
systemic risk arose due to the lack of appropriate mechanisms to deal with 
problems which arose from unregulated and/or unexpected sources. 
Examples include the necessity of rescuing AIG and also the lack of a 
mechanism for appropriately resolving Lehman Brothers.20 Prior to 2008, 
liquidity assistance was generally limited to banks. The crisis exposed the 
limitations of the separation of liquidity provision from prudential 
regulation, most obviously in the cases of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, and AIG. In addition to the clear need for effective 
resolution mechanisms for banks, the lack of a similar mechanism capable 
of dealing with non-banks or financial conglomerates (whether bank, thrift, 
or other financial holding company structures) has highlighted a key 
weakness in most regulatory systems. 
In hindsight, it is now clear that too much attention was placed on 
monetary policy rather than balancing monetary policy and financial 
stability, that regulatory attention focused excessively on the safety and 
soundness of individual financial institutions rather than on systemic risks 
and linkages across institutions and markets, that prudential regulatory and 
risk management systems did not take adequate account of market cycles 
and crises, and that the realities of potential failures of large complex 
financial institutions had not been adequately addressed in advance. 
Against this framework, this Article next turns to the post-crisis 
international regulatory agenda of the G-20 and FSB. 
II.  THE POST-CRISIS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENDA 
At the international level, since 2008 the G-20 has assumed the 
leading role in coordinating post-crisis responses and financial regulatory 
reforms, and thus its responses over the last three years logically provide 
 
 19. Id. at xxi. 
 20. See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 17, at 2. 
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the starting point for analysis of global financial reforms.21 While the G-20 
is not a traditional treaty-based international organization and its 
pronouncements have no international legal force, it has become the main 
policy-directing body for international financial and economic policy.22 The 
impact of the G-20 on international financial regulation results mainly from 
domestic implementation of internationally agreed approaches as well as 
through voting control of the more formal international organizations, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.23 Unlike areas 
such as trade and currency issues, the G-20 has arguably been quite 
effective in both formulating and implementing its international financial 
regulatory agenda. This section thus first discusses the contours of the G-20 
financial regulatory agenda, before turning to the consequential issue of 
mechanisms for ensuring its implementation. 
A. The First G-20 Leaders’ Summit: Establishing the Agenda for Post-
Crisis Financial Regulatory Reform 
At its initial leaders’ summit in Washington, D.C., in November 2008, 
the G-20 began to address financial regulatory reform by focusing on the 
causes of the global financial crisis and identifying its overall agenda. In 
 
 21. The G-20 was created in 1999 after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  About G-20, G-
20.ORG, http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). From 1999 to 
2008, it was comprised of ministers of finance and central bank governors meeting annually, 
supported by biannual meetings of deputy ministers and deputy central bank governors. Id. In 
November of 2008, it met at Washington, D.C., for the first time at the heads-of-government level. 
Id. Since that time, it has met four times at the heads of government level: in London, U.K. (Apr. 
2009); in Pittsburgh, Pa. (Sept. 2009); in Toronto, Can. (July 2010); and in Seoul, S. Kor. (Nov. 
2010). Id. The next G-20 leaders’ summit is scheduled for Paris, France in July of 2011. Since 
2008, the G-20 has also met twice per year (in advance of each leaders’ summit) at the level of 
deputy ministers of finance and deputy central bank governors. Id. Official communique  s are 
typically released for each leaders’ summit and each meeting of ministers of finance and central 
bank governors. Id. Meetings at the level of deputy ministers of finance and deputy central bank 
governors do not typically result in officially released communiqués. Id. 
 22. This Article considers only the G-20 agenda for financial regulatory reform and does not 
discuss G-20 initiatives relating to reform of the international financial architecture. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the Washington and London summits, see Arner, supra note 1, at 
120–34. For discussion of the G-20 agenda for reform of the international financial architecture, 
see Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Redesigning the Architecture of the Global Financial 
System, MELB. J. INT’L L., Nov. 2010, at 22–36, available at 
http://mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/issues/current-issue. 
 23. Control of the IMF and World Bank is exerted through a system of voting based on 
shareholding, with the G-20 holding together over eighty percent of the votes of both institutions. 
See JOHN HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR:  A CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF 
THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE WTO 113–15 (2008); Arner & Buckley, supra note 22, at 
27–30. 
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addressing the causes and necessary responses to the global financial crisis, 
the G-20 set the parameters for its approach to post-crisis financial 
regulation: 
[W]e will implement reforms that will strengthen financial markets 
and regulatory regimes so as to avoid future crises. Regulation is 
first and foremost the responsibility of national regulators who 
constitute the first line of defense against market instability. 
However, our financial markets are global in scope, therefore, 
intensified international cooperation among regulators and 
strengthening of international standards, where necessary, and their 
consistent implementation is necessary to protect against adverse 
cross-border, regional and global developments affecting 
international financial stability. Regulators must ensure that their 
actions support market discipline, avoid potentially adverse impacts 
on other countries, including regulatory arbitrage, and support 
competition, dynamism and innovation in the marketplace.24 
Leaders established five main principles to guide the reform agenda: 
(1) strengthening transparency and accountability; (2) enhancing sound 
regulation; (3) promoting integrity in financial markets; (4) reinforcing 
international cooperation; and (5) reforming the financial architecture.25 For 
each of these five principles, the G-20 agreed a detailed action plan, 
incorporating both immediate and medium-term actions and outlining the 
core agenda for post-crisis reform of international financial regulatory 
standards. The action plans for ―enhancing sound regulation‖ and 
―reinforcing international cooperation‖ are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 24. Group of Twenty (G-20), Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World 
Economy, at 2 (Nov. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 3. Issues relating to reform of the international financial architecture are beyond 
the scope of this Article. For detailed discussion, see generally Arner & Buckley, supra note 22; 
BUCKLEY & ARNER, supra note 1. 
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Table 1: Summary of G-20 Financial Regulatory Reform Agenda26 
 
Immediate Actions Medium-Term actions 
I. Regulatory Regimes 
Mitigate pro-cyclicality, including in the 
context of valuation and leverage, bank 
capital, executive compensation, and 
provisioning practices  
 
 Review of the structure and 
principles of individual 
regulatory systems to ensure 
compatibility with global 
finance. 
 G-20 members undertake a 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) report and 
support the transparent 
assessments of countries’ 
national regulatory systems  
 
 Review the differentiated nature of 
regulation in the banking, securities, and 
insurance sectors. Review scope of 
financial regulation, with a special 
emphasis on institutions, instruments, and 
markets that are currently unregulated, 
along with ensuring that all systemically-
important institutions are appropriately 
regulated.  
 
 Review resolution regimes and 
bankruptcy laws to ensure that they permit 
an orderly wind-down of large complex 
cross-border financial institutions.  
 
 Definitions of capital to be harmonized in 
order to achieve consistent measures of 
capital and capital adequacy.  
 
II.  Prudential Oversight 
Regulators to take steps to ensure that credit 
rating agencies meet high standards and 
avoid conflicts of interest, provide greater 
disclosure to investors and to issuers, and 
differentiate ratings for complex products.  
 
Credit Ratings Agencies that provide 
public ratings to be registered.  
 
Review credit rating agencies’ adoption of Develop robust and internationally 
 
 26. G-20, Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform (Nov. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf [hereinafter G-20, Action Plan]. 
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the standards and mechanisms for monitoring 
compliance.  
 
consistent approaches for liquidity 
supervision of, and central bank liquidity 
operations for, cross-border banks.  
 
Ensure that financial institutions maintain 
adequate capital. Set strengthened capital 
requirements for banks’ structured credit and 
securitization activities.  
 
 
Reduce the systemic risks of credit default 
swaps (CDS) and over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives transactions.  
 
 
III. Risk Management 
Develop enhanced guidance to strengthen 
banks’ risk management practices.  
 
Ensure that regulatory policy makers are 
aware and able to respond rapidly to 
evolution and innovation in financial 
markets and products.  
 
Develop and implement procedures to ensure 
that financial firms implement policies to 
better manage liquidity risk, including by 
creating strong liquidity cushions.  
 
Monitor substantial changes in asset 
prices and their implications for the 
macroeconomy and the financial system.  
 
Ensure that financial firms develop processes 
that provide for timely and comprehensive 
measurement of risk concentrations and large 
counterparty risk positions across products 
and geographies.  
 
 
Reassess their risk management models to 
guard against stress and report to supervisors 
on their efforts.  
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Exercise effective risk management and due 




IV.  Reinforcing International Cooperation 
Establish supervisory colleges for all major 
cross-border financial institutions.  
 
Collect information on areas where 
convergence in regulatory practices such 
as accounting standards, auditing, and 
deposit insurance is making progress, is in 
need of accelerated progress, or where 
there may be potential for progress.  
 
Strengthen cross-border crisis management 
arrangements.  
 
Ensure that temporary measures to restore 
stability and confidence have minimal 
distortions and are unwound in a timely, 
well-sequenced and coordinated manner.  
 
 
Within this agenda, G-20 leaders tasked their respective finance 
ministers to focus on developing concrete recommendations in six specific 
areas: 
(1)Mitigating against pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy; 
(2)Reviewing and aligning global accounting standards, 
particularly for complex securities in times of stress; 
(3)Strengthening the resilience and transparency of credit 
derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, 
including by improving the infrastructure of over-the-
counter markets; 
(4)Reviewing compensation practices as they relate to 
incentives for risk taking and innovation; 
(5)Reviewing the mandates, governance, and resource 
requirements of the [international financial institutions, 
especially the IMF]; and 
(6)Defining the scope of systemically important institutions 
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and determining their appropriate regulation or oversight.27 
This initial G-20 agenda clearly seek to address all the seven 
regulatory elements above as necessary to address systemic risk. However, 
as always, the real test of effectiveness lies in the approaches taken to 
address the individual elements. Subsequent leaders’ summits have 
successively agreed to progressively more detailed implementation 
arrangements. 
B. The Second G-20 Leaders’ Summit: Establishment of the FSB 
Building on the commitments and resolutions of this initial meeting, 
the G-20 leaders met in London in April 2009 for their second summit.  
The second summit focused mainly on fleshing out policy directions within 
the context of the agenda set at the first leaders’ summit in November 2008 
in Washington. Leaders agreed to policy directions in major areas of the 
reform agenda and established a new organization, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), to be responsible for technical details and to monitor 
implementation. In the resulting communique, G-20 leaders reaffirmed 
their commitment to the Washington agenda and action plan for financial 
regulatory reform28 and announced a range of substantive agreements in 
major areas of the action plan,29 with additional details in a supplementary 
declaration. 30  The result was agreement on the guiding parameters for 
specific action items of the Washington financial regulatory reform agenda. 
Of greatest significance, in relation to international cooperation and 
financial standards, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), established along 
with the G-20 in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, was 
renamed and reconstituted as the FSB.31 The G-20 leaders provided the 
 
 27. G-20, supra note 24, at 4. 
 28. Commencing a pattern which has been repeated at subsequent summits, the G-20 
released a detailed progress report on implementation of previous commitments. G-20 London 
Summit, Progress Report on the Actions of the Washington Action Plan (Apr. 2, 2009), available 
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/FINAL_Annex_on_Action_Plan.pdf. 
 29. G-20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, ¶ 1316, (Apr. 2, 2009) available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf [hereinafter G-20, Global Plan]. 
 30. G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (Apr. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf.  The 
Declaration in fact addresses eight areas: (1) ―Financial Stability Board‖; (2) ―International 
cooperation‖; (3) ―Prudential regulation‖; (4) ―The scope of regulation‖; (5) ―Compensation‖; (6) 
―Tax havens and non-cooperative jurisdictions‖; (7) ―Accounting standards‖; and (8) ―Credit 
Rating Agencies.‖ Id. The Declaration also addresses issues relating to the IMF and FSB’s 
developing early warning systems. Id. at 1. 
 31. For a detailed discussion of the FSB, see Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The 
Global Credit Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International 
ARNER.FPP 4/19/2011  4:12 PM 
114 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
 
FSB with a mandate to coordinate international financial regulatory 
initiatives and monitor their implementation. 32  Hosted by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) 33  in Basel, Switzerland, the FSB brings 
together G-20 finance ministries, central banks, and regulatory authorities, 
along with the main international and regional financial institutions: the 
BIS, IMF, World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), European Central Bank, and European Commission. 
In addition, the main international standard-setting bodies are included: the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS), and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS).34 
 As reconstituted following the 2009 London G-20 summit, the FSB 
has a ten-point mandate detailing its role in supporting international 
financial regulatory cooperation. 35  In turn, FSB member jurisdictions, 
 
Financial Regulation?, 32 U. N.S. WALES L.J. 488 (2009). 
 32. The FSB Charter provides: 
 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is established to coordinate at the 
international level the work of national financial authorities and international 
standard setting bodies (SSBs) in order to develop and promote the 
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector 
policies. In collaboration with the international financial institutions, the FSB 
will address vulnerabilities affecting financial systems in the interest of global 
financial stability. 
 
FSB Charter, art. 1, available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications 
/r_090925d.pdf [hereinafter FSB Charter].  The FSB Charter explicitly provides that it is not a 
legal document.  Id., art. 16 (―This Charter is not intended to create any legal rights or 
obligations.‖). 
 33. Formed initially to support reparations payments in the wake of World War I, the BIS is 
now the main international organization for central banks. BIS HistoryOverview, BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://bis.org/about/history.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).  
Today, the BIS serves as the main international organization and forum for central banks.  About 
BIS, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://bis.org/about/index.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).  
The BIS also hosts a range of financial regulatory organizations, such as the FSB.  Douglas W. 
Arner et al., Central Banks and Central Bank Cooperation in the Global Financial System, 23 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 1, 40 (2010) (discussing the BIS in detail). 
 34. See Links to FSB Members, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (listing 
FSB members). 
 35. The FSB Charter specifically provides: 
(1) As part of its mandate, the FSB will: 
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subject to FSB reporting and evaluation, commit to ―pursue the 
maintenance of financial stability‖; ―maintain the openness and 
transparency of the financial sector‖; ―implement international financial 
standards‖; and ―undergo periodic peer reviews, using among other 
evidence IMF/World Bank public Financial Sector Assessment Program 
reports.‖36 
The FSB can therefore be seen as the central organization responsible 
for coordinating detailed development of the G-20 international regulatory 
reform agenda and also for monitoring its implementation. 
C. The Third and Fourth Leaders’ Summits: Maintaining Commitment 
The third and fourth leaders’ summits in September 2009 and June 
2010 were most significant in affirming commitment to the agreed agenda 
and major policy directions established in previous summits. In September 
2009, at their third summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, G-20 leaders 
reiterated their support for existing initiatives and committed to continuing 
implementation of previously agreed-upon actions. 37  Unlike the 
 
(a) assess vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and identify and 
review on a timely and ongoing basis the regulatory, supervisory and related 
actions needed to address them, and their outcomes; 
(b) promote coordination and information exchange among authorities responsible 
for financial stability; 
(c) monitor and advise on market developments and their implications for 
regulatory policy; 
(d) advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory standards; 
(e) undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development work of the 
international standard setting bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, 
focused on priorities and addressing gaps; 
(f) set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges; 
(g) support contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly 
with respect to systemically important firms; 
(h) collaborate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to conduct Early 
Warning Exercises; and 
(i) undertake any other tasks agreed by its Members in the course of its activities 
and within the framework of this Charter. 
(2) The FSB will promote and help coordinate the alignment of the activities of the SSBs 
to address any overlaps or gaps and clarify demarcations in light of changes in national 
and regional regulatory structures relating to prudential and systemic risk, market 
integrity and investor and consumer protection, infrastructure, as well as accounting and 
auditing. 
FSB Charter, supra note 32, art. 2. 
 36. Id. at art. 5(1). 
 37. See generally G-20, The Pittsburgh Summit Leaders’ Statement (Sept 2425, 2009), 
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf 
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Washington or London summits, in the area of international financial 
regulatory reform the Pittsburgh summit did little more than reaffirm 
commitment to the previously established agenda. While not a dramatic 
achievement, this reaffirmation served to continue the process of 
development of technical proposals through the FSB and its constituents. 
In June 2010, at their fourth summit in Toronto, Ontario, G-20 leaders 
refocused attention on financial sector reform under a four-pillar structure: 
first, ―a strong regulatory framework,‖ second, ―effective supervision,‖ 
third, ―resolution and addressing systemic institutions,‖ and fourth, 
―transparent international assessment and peer review.‖38 This framework, 
while useful analytically, was not repeated in the most recent leaders’ 
summit at Seoul, South Korea in November of 2010. 
D. The Fifth G-20 Leaders’ Summit: Endorsing the “New Financial 
Regulatory Framework” 
In November 2010, in their fifth summit in Seoul, South Korea, 
leaders addressed a range of issues, including international financial 
regulation.39 Significantly, the fifth summit in November 2010 announced 
general agreement on technical details developed through the FSB and its 
constituent organizations. In relation to financial regulation, abandoning 
the four-pillar structure of the Toronto summit, the G-20 announced the 
adoption of the ―core elements of a new financial regulatory framework to 
transform the global financial system.‖40 Specific policies adopted address: 
(1) ―capital and liquidity standards‖; (2) ―systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs)‖ and ―global SIFIs (G-SIFIs)‖; (3) financial institution 
resolution; (4) supervisory effectiveness; and (5) implementation.41 
 
(discussing previous actions and new initiatives for improving the global economy) [hereinafter 
G-20, Pittsburgh Leaders’ Statement]; 
G-20, Progress Report on the Actions to Promote Financial Regulatory Reform Issued by the U.S. 
Chair of the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit (2009), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_progress_report_250909.pdf (reiterating the 
commitment and specific regulations aimed at improving the global economic crisis).  
 38. See G-20, The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, at 45 (June 26-27, 2010), available 
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_declaration_en.pdf [hereinafter G-20, Toronto Summit]. 
 39.   See generally G-20, The G-20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration (Nov. 11-12, 2010), 
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf (outlining a 
new stage of international financial regulation and continued commitment to previously 
implemented rules) [hereinafter G-20, Seoul Summit]. 
 40. Id. at 7. 
 41. G-20, The Seoul Summit Document, at 79 (Nov. 1112, 2010), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf. In addition, leaders 
identified a range of regulatory issues for further attention, specifically: (1) ―macro-prudential 
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The period following the fifth summit, consequently, constitutes an 
ideal point to review whether the G-20 has in fact put in place the ―core 
elements of a new financial regulatory framework‖ sufficient, at a 
minimum, to have prevented the global financial crisis. 42  Table 2 
summarizes the official view of the G-20 and FSB of the status of the post-
crisis financial regulatory reform agenda at the conclusion of the fifth 
leaders’ summit: 
Table 2: 
G-20/FSB Financial Regulatory Reform Agenda: Review of Status43 
 
FSB Objective Status 
Building high quality capital and liquidity 
standards and mitigating procyclicality 
Draft capital and liquidity standards agreed 
Addressing SIFIs and resolution regimes Framework approach agreed 
Improving the OTC derivatives markets Detailed principles agreed 
Strengthening accounting standards Convergence between U.S. and 
international accounting standards in 
progress 
Strengthening adherence to international 
supervisory and regulatory standards 
FSB established and monitoring exercises 
in progress 
Reforming compensation practices to 
support financial stability 
Detailed principles, standards and guidance 
agreed; implementation being monitored 
Developing macroprudential frameworks 
and tools 
In progress 




policy frameworks‖; (2) ―reforms relating to emerging market and developing countries‖; (3) 
―shadow banking‖; (4) ―commodity derivatives markets‖; (5) ―market integrity and efficiency‖; 
and (6) ―consumer protection.‖ Id. at 910. 
 42. G-20, supra note 39, at 2. 
 43. FSB, Progress Since the Washington Summit in the Implementation of the G20 
Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability: Report of the Financial Stability Board 
to G20 Leaders (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110219.pdf [hereinafter G-20, Progress 
Since Washington Summit]; G-20, Progress Report on the Economic and Financial Actions of the 
Previous G20 Summits, at 1826 (Jul. 2010), available at: 
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/07/July_2010_G20_Progress_Grid.pdf. 
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The following Part addresses financial infrastructure and prudential 
regulatory standards, incorporating the G-20/FSB initiatives relating to 
capital, OTC derivatives, accounting and compensation. These are the areas 
where arguably the most concrete progress has been achieved and are the 
central parts of the G-20’s ―core elements.‖ Parts V and VI then turn to 
issues where arguably less has been achieved, namely macroprudential 
supervision and regulatory design, and addressing SIFIs and financial 
institution resolution, respectively.44 
IV.  FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
The G-20 and FSB have focused on five areas to improve financial 
infrastructure and prudential regulation: (1) capital, leverage, liquidity, and 
procyclicality; (2) OTC derivatives markets; (3) accounting standards; (4) 
compensation arrangements; and (5) expanding the regulatory perimeter to 
address hedge funds, credit ratings and credit rating agencies, and 
securitization.45 This Part discusses progress in each area. 
A. Capital, Leverage, and Liquidity 
Weaknesses in capital and liquidity, combined with excess leverage, 
was a central factor underlying the global financial crisis.46 As a result, the 
G-20 and FSB have placed major attention on regulatory reform in these 
areas. In addressing related issues, however, G-20 members face 
conflicting objectives. Specifically, stronger capital requirements are 
necessary to prevent future crises, but at the same time, higher capital 
requirements restrict lending, thereby limiting the financial sector’s 
capacity to support growth amid economic weakness. 47  This is further 
complicated by the different economic situations across the G-20, with the 
United States, Europe, and Japan experiencing weak growth, while 
emerging markets, especially in Asia, are at risk of possible overheating 
 
 44. For discussion of implementation arrangements, see generally Arner & Taylor, supra 
note 31, suggesting international views on implementing financial regulations globally.  
 45. FSB, Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for 
Strengthening Financial Stability, at 2 (June 18, 2010) [hereinafter FSB Overview], available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100627c.pdf?frames=0. 
 46. See FCIC, supra note 1, at xixxx. 
 47. See, e.g., Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], Global Financial Stability Report: Sovereigns, 
Funding, and Systemic Liquidity, at 3839 (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf. 
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and asset price inflation.48 
In 2008 and 2009, the G-20 committed to introducing an enhanced 
system for capital regulation, along with new international regulatoary 
standards addressing liquidity and leverage regulation, with the BCBS and 
FSB given the task of development. 49  This revised framework is now 
referred to as Basel III. 
To implement this G-20 mandate, the BCBS has begun to develop 
detailed recommendations for adoption. In April of 2009 it made a series of 
recommendations for addressing procyclicality. 50  In July of 2009 it 
announced measures to strengthen the market risk framework 51  and 
enhance Basel II. 52  Initial changes included introducing higher-risk 
weightings for securitization, issues relating to supervisory review of risk 
management, and disclosure requirements.53 Third, the Committee released 
for consultation, as part of its comprehensive approach announced in 
September 2009, a proposal to address (1) improving the quality and 
harmonization of capital, focusing on the role of Tier 1 equity; (2) 
strengthening counterparty capital requirements relating to derivatives, 
repos, and securities financing, with an intention to incentivize movement 
to central counterparties and exchanges; (3) introducing a leverage ratio; (4) 
measures to promote a countercyclical capital framework, including 
 
 48. See, e.g., IMF, World Economic Outlook: Recovery, Risk, and Rebalancing, at 6177 
(Oct. 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf. 
 49. The BCBS was formed in 1974 to coordinate international banking regulation among G-
10 countries. Basel Comm. on Baking Supervision [BCBS], History of the Basel Committee and 
its Membership, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf. In 1988, the BCBS 
agreed the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, setting the basic framework for regulation of capital of 
internationally active banks, subsequently adopted in over 100 countries. Id. at 2. Following the 
Asian financial crisis, it released a revised framework in 2004, known as Basel II. Id. at 3. For 
discussion of Basel I and Basel II and their role in the global financial crisis, see Arner, Global 
Credit Crisis, supra note 1. For discussion of the development of the Basel Committee, see 
JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 171224 
(1995). 
 50. Fin. Stability Forum [FSF], Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing 
Procyclicality in the Financial System, passim (Apr. 2009). 
 51. See BCBS, Revisions to the Basel II Market Risk Framework, 13 (July 2009) available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.pdf; BCBS, GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING CAPITAL FOR 
INCREMENTAL RISK IN THE TRADING BOOK 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs/159.pdf. 
 52. BCBS, Enhancements to the Basel II Framework, passim (July 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf. 
 53. While Basel II is being replaced with Basel III, at present, the risk-weighting system and 
the three Pillar structure of Basel II are being maintained, so these changes are incorporated into 
the new framework. 
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provisioning; and (5) introducing a minimum liquidity standard.54 
In June 2010, the G-20 reiterated its support for development of ―a 
new global regime for bank capital and liquidity.‖55 Under the agreement, 
―the amount of capital will be significantly higher‖ and ―the quality of 
capital will be significantly improved‖ to ―enable banks to withstand—
without extraordinary government support—stresses of a magnitude 
associated with the recent financial crisis.‖56 Specifically, the G-20 agreed 
that the new capital framework would: 
(1) establish a new requirement that each bank hold in Tier 1 
capital, at a minimum, an increasing share of common equity, 
after deductions, measured as a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets sufficient to withstand with going concern fully-loss 
absorbing capital stresses equivalent to those of the global 
financial crisis; and 
(2)move to a globally consistent and transparent set of 
conservative deductions generally applied at the level of 
common equity or its equivalent in the case of non-joint stock 
companies over a suitable globally consistent transition period.
 
57 
Finally, almost two years after the first G-20 leaders’ summit, the 
BCBS agreed in September of 2010 to the underlying elements of the new 
Basel III capital adequacy regime.58 This new system was endorsed by the 
G-20 at their Seoul summit in November of 2010.59 
Under Basel III, in relation to capital, rather than the Basel I–Basel II 
framework of 8% capital to risk-weighted assets, with at least half in Tier 1 
equity and hybrid instruments supplemented by Tier 2 subordinated debt 
and a range of innovative instruments supporting market risk (Tier 3),60 the 
BCBS adopted a structure focused on common equity capital. Under the 
 
 54. BCBS, Consultative Document: Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, at 
23 (Dec. 2009); BCBS, Consultative Document: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement Standards and Monitoring, at 12 (Dec. 2009). 
 55. G-20, Toronto Summit, supra note 38, at 4. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 16. 
 58. Press Release, BCBS, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces Higher 
Global Minimum Capital Standards 1 (Sep. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Group of Governors], 
available at http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?frames=0. 
 59. G-20, supra note 39, at 7. 
 60. BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurements and Capital Standards, at 
12, 1617 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcs128.pdf. 
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agreement, total minimum capital remains at 8%.61  However, minimum 
common equity capital is 4.5%, with Tier 1 capital at 6%, leaving Tier 2 at 
most 2%.62 In addition, there will be a 2.5% conservation buffer, made up 
of common equity, for a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10.5%. 63 
Finally, there will be the possibility for an additional countercyclical buffer 
of 02.5% of common equity or ―other fully loss absorbing capital‖, the 
details of which are yet to be finalized.64 
It is now abundantly clear that financial institutions, as now required 
by markets, will in many cases need to have higher amounts of equity 
capital. In addition, the global crisis highlighted that subordinated debt, 
when held by other financial institutions, is unlikely to provide for external 
monitoring, thereby detracting from its ability to support corporate 
governance and financial stability. 65  As a result, subordinated debt has 
become significantly less important in terms of capital. 
The crisis has also brought forward proposals relating to innovative 
capital instruments, such as contingent convertible securities (―cocos‖), 
which automatically convert to equity when financial institutions’ capital 
ratios drop to certain preset levels, as well as other hybrids pre-committing 
investors to provide additional capital as equity or debt at certain trigger 
points.66 At this point, however, there is no internationally agreed approach 
to these sorts of instruments. 
The other side of the equation is also being considered, relating to the 
various methodologies for calculating risk-weightings for assets. While 
Basel I was overly simplistic, Basel II was overly complex and too reliant 
on both external credit ratings and internal quantitative models. As a result, 
both were highly subject to gaming by market participants, with regulators 
in the U.S. and UK adopting excessively permissive approaches to such 
behavior and instruments.
67
 The crisis has also emphasized the need to 
address the way that financial institutions calculate their assets. Issues 
relating to off-balance-sheet treatment are being reconsidered and tightened 
 
 61. BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and 
Banking Systems, at 64 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See U.K. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 1, at 4547. 
 66. See, e.g., Patrick Jenkins & Haig Simonian, Swiss Urge Capital Boost for Banks, THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at 21  available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4a24a1c8-cf26-
11df-9be2-00144feab49a.html#axzz1ElFnb31W. 
67
 See generally Arner, supra note 1. 
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to avoid a return of the shadow banking system and also to reduce 
complexity of institutions and products. One area receiving particularly 
close scrutiny is market risk, with the view that market risk should be much 
more closely regulated than has previously been the case.68 Such issues are 
tied closely not only with regulatory standards, but also with accounting 
treatment. 
Beyond capital, Basel III includes both leverage and liquidity 
standards. As of January 2011, liquidity standards have been finalized69 but 
remain under discussion, while the leverage ratio at present is being tested 
on an experimental basis, without any final agreement. Beyond bank 
capital, the work of the BCBS, and the emergence of Basel III, other 
financial standards setters (namely IOSCO for securities and the IAIS for 
insurance) are now developing parallel capital frameworks to enhance 
financial stability and reduce regulatory arbitrage at G-20 direction.70 
In reviewing progress, the development of comprehensive new 
standards for capital, with much higher requirements for equity capital and 
the reduction of the role of subordinated debt is clearly an important 
development. However, studies suggest that even at the new Basel III rates, 
capital would still be insufficient to meet the stresses faced in the global 
financial crisis. 71  At the same time, the complexity has not been 
significantly decreased, indicating the continuing possibility of market 
participants’ seeking to game the new system, as they became highly adept 
at doing with both Basel I and Basel II. 
In relation to liquidity, while agreement on a new international 
approach is significant, the reality of the standards themselves is that they 
are highly subjective and therefore subject to great variations between 
markets. At the same time, liquidity must be complemented by work in 
other areas, especially OTC derivatives (the subject of the next section) and 
issues relating to overall market liquidity provision (discussed in Part VI). 
As a result, while there is now an internationally agreed approach to 
 
 68. See, e.g., BCBS, Messages from the Academic Literature on Risk Measurement for the 
Trading Book (BCBS, Working Paper No. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp19.pdf; BCBS, Findings on the Interaction of Credit Risk and 
Market Risk, (BCBS, Working Paper No. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp16.pdf. 
 69. BCBS, Basel III: International Standards for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards 
and Monitoring, at 325 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf. 
 70. See Tables 1 & 2 supra and sources cited. 
 71. See, for example, BCBS, An Assessment of the Long-term Economic Impact of Stronger 
Capital and Liquidity Requirements, at 1417 (Aug. 2010), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf. 
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liquidity, in practice, the implications are highly unclear. 
In relation to leverage, a simple leverage ratio has the important 
potential to not only limit a central aspect of the buildup of the crisis 
(through leverage and related asset price inflation), but also to limit the 
potential for gaming the capital framework, which given its complexity is 
to some extent unavoidable. Leverage and capital are thus probably the two 
most important international prudential regulatory issues. At this point, the 
G-20’s core elements do not yet contain a simple, internationally agreed 
standard, necessary to complement complex capital requirements. Without 
an agreed limit on leverage, the G-20’s reform project fails to meet the test 
of being able to prevent the last crisis, before even considering the next 
crisis. 
At the same time, given the increasing lack of differentiation between 
business models of banks, securities firms and insurance companies, there 
is a clear need to urgently develop capital, leverage, and liquidity standards 
that apply to non-banks, especially to the extent that different institutions 
are conducting similar activities. Significantly, the G-20 has made this a 
priority moving forward but its absence at present is further evidence that 
international regulatory reforms to date are still not sufficient to have 
prevented the global financial crisis. 
B. OTC Derivatives Markets 
The global financial crisis has also exposed the need for a 
comprehensive overhaul of derivative regulation. Prior to the global 
financial crisis, regulation of OTC derivatives markets was generally left to 
private ordering, most often led by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), with markets limited to only sophisticated participants 
and supervision being undertaken through monitoring of the major bank 
participants in the market.72 At the same time, OTC derivatives received 
significant legal and regulatory support through amendments to Basel I and 
their incorporation into Basel II, as well as legal changes to support netting 
in many jurisdictions.
73
 In the wake of the global financial crisis, the lack 
of transparency in these instruments and markets has been a particular area 
of concern, especially given their central role in the context of the near 
collapse of AIG in 2008 and concerns about their role in the 2010 Greek 
debt crisis.74 
 
 72. SCHUYLER HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES (1st ed. 2003). 
 73. See generally Arner, supra note 1. 
 74. See William Sjostrom, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 98990 (2009). 
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The G-20 has identified strengthening the resilience and transparency 
of credit derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, including by 
improving the infrastructure of the OTC markets, as an area of priority 
concern. In this context, the G-20 and FSB have focused on five elements: 
(1) standardization, (2) central clearing, (3) exchange or electronic platform 
trading, and (4) reporting to trade repositories.75 
In relation to OTC markets, to provide technical expertise similar to 
that provided by the BCBS in the context of banking, in 2009 an OTC 
Derivatives Regulators’ Forum (ODRF) was established.76 In June 2010, 
the G-20 pledged to accelerate the implementation of OTC derivatives 
regulation, reaffirming commitments to trade all standardized OTC 
derivatives on exchanges or electronic clearing platforms and clear through 
central counterparty clearinghouses (CCPs) by the end of 2012, with 
reporting to trade repositories.77 Most significantly, the FSB released a set 
of twenty-one principles designed to implement the G-20 agenda in relation 
to OTC derivatives.78 In furtherance of this G-20/FSB plan, IOSCO and the 
CPSS are currently reviewing existing standards for central counterparties 
and developing standards for OTC derivatives trade repositories, with draft 
guidance released in May 2010 79  and draft principles released for 
consultation in March 2011.80  
Overall, the FSB principles provide significant detail of an agreed 
approach to achieve the four targets identified by the G-20. Their 
effectiveness, however, will only be determinable in about three years 
timethe amount of time it will probably take for major financial 
jurisdictions to implement the principles through legislation and/or 
regulation. While the agreed approach may be successful in time in 
addressing counterparty risks and even in migrating products to more 
transparent and robust exchange-based environments, it is certainly the 
case at present that markets remain largely unchanged from their pre-crisis 
 
 75. FSB, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, at 1 (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf. 
 76. See THE OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS’ FORUM, http://www.otcdrf.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2011). 
 77. G-20, Toronto Summit, supra note 38, at 19. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Comm. on Payment & Settlement Sys, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns [CPSS-IOSCO], 
Guidance on the Application of the 2004 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Central 
Counterparties to OTC Derivatives CCPs, at 39 (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf. 
 80. CPSS & IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures: Consultative Report 
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss94.pdf.  
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form. 
C. Accounting Standards 
The role of accounting standards in the global financial crisis is a 
divisive issue, with many arguing that market-based accounting for 
financial instruments (―market-to-market‖) was central in worsening the 
crisis, as financial institutions were forced to continually revalue assets in 
downward spiraling markets, thereby giving an illusion of ever greater and 
more solvency-threatening losses.81 Others argue that financial assets can 
only be valued at current market prices and that any alternative hides the 
real financial condition of financial institutions, thus impeding necessary 
failures and restructuring.82 At the same time, there is little disagreement 
that the lack of transparency of institutions, products, and markets was 
central to the process of adverse selection and loss of confidence central to 
the global financial crisis.83 Likewise, issues relating to transparency made 
regulation of firms, markets, and products difficult, and complicated 
responses as the crisis developed. 
In addressing accounting, the G-20 has repeatedly stated its 
commitment to the development of a single set of international accounting 
standards.84 At the same time, it appears increasingly likely that, for the 
foreseeable future, there will remain two main systems of accounting: 
IASB International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and U.S. 
 
 81. See, e.g., Mark It and Weep: Mark-to-Market Accounting Hurts, But There is No Better 
Way, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2008, at 14, 14, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/10808525; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SECURITIES & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF THE 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: STUDY ON MARK-TO-MARKET 
ACCOUNTING 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf.   
 82. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, supra note 81, at 2. 
 83. See U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at xix–xxiv (describing the lack of 
transparency in markets, products and institutions such as large securities firms and the 
governmental regulatory agencies); U.K. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 1, at 45 (noting that 
many responses to the financial crisis call for increased disclosure and transparency as the single 
most important response); THE HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE E.U., supra note 
1, at 8 (concluding that the lack of transparency combined with the complexity of structured 
financial products contributed to the breakdown in confidence in financial institutions which 
spread to tensions in other parts of the financial sector). 
 84. See G-20, Action Plan, supra note 26, at 1 (listing the development of global accounting 
standards as both an immediate and medium-term goal); G-20, Progress Since Washington 
Summit, supra note 43, at 52–53 (reiterating the G-20’s goal of achieving a ―single set of high 
quality, global accounting standards‖ and noting the progress that has been made since the 2008 
summit). 
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). At present, major 
issues have arisen in the context of what is the appropriate focus of 
accounting: the fair value approach based on market values or the historical 
basis approach focused on longer horizons.85 While accounting standard-
setters are moving closer on these issues, they are likely to remain 
contentious for some time. 
In addition, there are a range of issues relating to the relationship 
between accounting and regulatory treatment, for instance in relation to 
capital, off-balance sheet treatment, and provisioning. In this context, one 
objective of Basel II was to bring economic, accounting, and regulatory 
capital together. At present, in this author’s opinion, standards and 
approaches to economic, accounting, and regulatory capital may once again 
be diverging, even though convergence of the three forms of capital 
remains a goal. 
D. Compensation Arrangements 
Improperly assigned incentives inherent in pre-crisis financial sector 
compensation arrangements played an important role in the buildup of 
excesses leading to the global financial crisis, leading to short-term bias 
and excessive risk-taking.86 Particular attention has therefore been focused 
on compensation practices in the financial sector, including in the G-20, 
with compensation reform as an important reform agenda item since the 
first leaders’ summit in 2008. 87  These commitments have been 
implemented through G-20 endorsement of new FSB compensation 
principles88 and implementation standards.89 In relation to implementation, 
the FSB concluded a thematic review of member implementation of the 
 
 85. See generally sources cited supra note 1 (describing controversy that has arisen over 
accounting methods). 
 86. See FCIC, supra note 1, at xix, 61–64 (criticizing compensation systems that rewarded 
the ―quick deal‖ and encouraged the ―big bet‖); HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE 
E.U., supra note 1, at 30–31 (recommending that compensation incentives should be better 
aligned with shareholder interests and long-term firm-wide profitability in place of the short-term, 
high-risk compensation incentives that led to the crisis). 
 87. See Tables 1 & 2 supra. 
 88. See FSF, FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, at 1 (Apr. 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf?frames=0 (setting 
forth recommendations that ―are intended to reduce incentives towards excessive risk taking that 
may arise from the structure of compensation schemes‖). 
 89. See generally FSF, FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: Implementation 
Standards (Sep. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf?frames=0 (outlining standards 
for the swift implementation of compensation reforms). 
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compensation principles and standards in 2010, its first review of the 
implementation of post-crisis standards under its new mandate.90 
Compensation is the first major area where the initial G-20 agenda has 
proceeded through detailed agreement, implementation and FSB review, 
with overall implementation and compliance across FSB members. As a 
result, this can be seen as a key test for the effectiveness of the process. At 
the least, regulators around the world are now considering compensation as 
one element of their supervisory mandate, and financial institutions have 
implemented changes to change compensation practices accordingly. At 
present, the impact is uncertain. The central question will be whether 
regulators over time are able to maintain focus in this respect. 
E. Expanding the Regulatory Perimeter: Regulation of Non-traditional 
Financial Firms 
At the heart of the global financial crisis were markets, financial 
institutions and products structured to avoid regulationthe ―shadow 
banking system‖and also markets, institutions and products which were 
viewed as not requiring regulation, such as OTC derivatives. In the wake of 
the global financial crisis, there is consensus among G-20 and FSB 
members that markets, institutions and products should no longer be 
unregulated but that all aspects of the financial sector should be subject to 
appropriate levels of regulation and supervision.91 In the context of the G-
20 financial reform agenda, related issues have been loosely grouped 
together under the heading of ―expanding and refining the regulatory 
perimeter,‖92with the central focus to date being hedge funds and credit 
ratings and credit rating agencies. In addition, issues relating to 
securitization and shadow banking generally are now being discussed. 
1.  Hedge Funds 
While hedge funds were often viewed as major causes of the 199798 
Asian financial crisis, during the recent global financial crisis, they have 
not received a central portion of the blame. 93  Due to the lack of 
 
 90. FSB, Thematic Review on Compensation: Peer Review Report (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf. 
 91. See supra Tables 1 & 2. 
 92. FSB, supra note 42, at 25-31. 
 93. HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE E.U., supra note 1, at 24 (―[H]edge 
funds . . . did not play a major role in the emergence of the crisis.‖). For detailed discussion, see 
SEBASTIAN MALLABY, MORE MONEY THAN GOD: HEDGE FUNDS AND THE MAKING OF A NEW 
ELITE 914 (2010). 
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transparency in the industry, however, they have still remained a 
continuing issue for attention, especially in continental Europe.94 At the 
international level, the G-20 has agreed that hedge funds should be subject 
to appropriate regulation, especially in the context of systemically 
important hedge funds.95 To date, IOSCO has established six high level 
principles for regulation,96 guidance addressing funds of hedge funds,97 and 
a template for the global collection of hedge fund information to support 
transparency and supervision.98  Significantly, IOSCO released a revised 
version of its key principles document, Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation, including a new principle requiring hedge funds and 
hedge fund managers/advisors to be subject to appropriate oversight.99 
Overall, while not directly a cause of the global financial crisis, the 
lack of transparency in the hedge fund industry poses clear potential risks 
for financial stability going forward. As a result, this may be one area 
where the international regulatory reform agenda is in fact successful in 
moving beyond merely addressing the causes of the last crisis to seeking to 
address future risks. 
2.  Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies 
Prior to the global financial crisis, credit rating agencies (CRAs) had 
been periodically subject to criticism in the context of most corporate and 
financial crises.100 As a result some attention had been given to their role 
and regulation, such as IOSCO’s 2003 Principles for the Activities of 
Credit Rating Agencies 101  and Code of Conduct. 102  However, since the 
global financial crisis, credit ratings and CRAs have become a central focus. 
As an initial step in 2008, IOSCO revised the Code of Conduct in 
 
 94. See id. 
 95. See supra Tables 1 & 2 & sources cited. 
 96. See IOSCO, Hedge Funds Oversight: Final Report, at 89 (June 2009), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf. 
 97. Id. at 79. 
 98. See FSB, supra note 36, at 13. 
 99. IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, at 10 (Jul. 2010), available 
at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf. 
 100. See generally A. Sy, The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated 
Markets, (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/09/129, Jun. 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09129.pdf. 
 101. IOSCO, IOSCO Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating 
Agencies (Sep. 2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD151.pdf. 
 102. Technical Comm., IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies: 
Report of the Technical Committee, at 12 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf. 
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response to the initial stages of the crisis, including adding provisions 
regarding structured finance.
 103 The FSF also met and released a report on 
Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience which, in many ways, would 
come to be overshadowed by subsequent events. In this report, the FSF 
focused on regulatory reforms in five main areas, including the role and 
uses of credit ratings, and a mandate to review the use of credit ratings and 
regulation of CRAs through IOSCO, the Joint Forum, and domestic 
regulators.104 This report focused on two main aspects: first, regulation of 
CRAs, and, second, reducing regulatory and market reliance on credit 
ratings themselves.105 In a follow-up report during the systemic phase of the 
crisis, the FSF reviewed progress and recommitted to the content of its 
April 2008 report, including CRAs and credit ratings, especially in regard 
to establishing a globally consistent approach to CRA regulation.106 Both of 
these FSF reports were subsequently largely subsumed in the November 
2008, April 2009, and September 2009 G-20 statements, all of which 
express commitment to the regulation of CRAs. 
IOSCO recently has conducted a review of the implementation of the 
Code of Conduct 107  and released guidance relating to international 
cooperation in CRA oversight. 108  More significantly, and related to the 
2008 FSF report, the Joint Forum has reviewed the use of credit ratings.109 
Most significantly, in June of 2010, the G-20 committed ―to reduce reliance 
on external ratings in rules and regulations,‖110 with the FSB releasing a 
related principles in October 2010.111 
 
 103. Technical Comm., IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies: 
Report of the Technical Committee, at 56, 1011 (rev. 2008), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf. 
 104. FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional 
Resilience, at 2, 34, 39, 44 (2008), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf. 
 105. Id. at 3239. 
 106. FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional 
Resilience: Follow-up on Implementation, at 29, 2023 (2008), 
http://www.financialsbailityboard.org/press/pr_081009f.pdf. 
 107. IOSCO, A Review of the Implementation of the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals 
for Credit Rating Agencies–Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, at 3 (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD286.pdf. 
 108. IOSCO, International Cooperation in Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies: Report of the 
Technical Committee of IOSCO, at 3-5 (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD287.pdf. 
 109. Joint Forum, BCBS, Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings, at 12 (Jun. 2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf. 
 110. G-20, Toronto Summit, supra note 38, at 19. 
 111. FSB, Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings, at 1-7 (Oct. 2010), available at 
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Credit ratings and CRAs certainly share an important portion of the 
blame for the global financial crisis. In initial international efforts, focusing 
on registration and regulation of CRAs, the G-20, FSB, and IOSCO began 
the process of addressing related issues. However, the determination in 
2010 to refocus attention on reducing reliance on credit ratings must be 
seen as by far the most important step from the standpoint of systemic 
stability, with the new principles setting the basis for addressing an 
important element underlying the global financial crisis. 
3.  Securitization 
Techniques of securitization were clearly abused prior to the global 
financial crisis. Instruments, markets, and methodologies—especially their 
overcomplexity, financialization, and lack of transparency—were at the 
heart of the crisis.112 At the same time, securitization provides a range of 
potential benefits in relation to financing and risk-sharing. 113  While 
securitization should not be prohibited, significant changes to regulatory 
treatment are necessary to support effectively functioning markets. To date, 
securitization markets have not yet recovered internationally. While a range 
of reports and standards have been released, 114  significant questions 
regarding the future of securitization remain. 
This is a clear area requiring further international attention and one at 
the heart of the most recent crisis. Since the market is still barely 
functioning, the issue currently has less urgency than others. However, if 
the issue is not addressed comprehensively at the international level in the 
near future, it is most certainly possible that momentum for reform will be 




 112. See FCIC, supra note 1, at 4245, 6772; FIN SERVS. AUTH., supra note 1, at 1416; 
HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE E.U., supra note 1, at 3942. 
 113. See generally D. Arner et al., The Global Credit Crisis and Securitization in East Asia, 
CAPITAL MARKETS L.J., July 2008, 291 (2008) (noting that securitization has the ability to assist 
with funding and investment in East Asia). 
 114. See generally Joint Forum, BCBS, Report on Special Purpose Entities (2009), available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf (describing special purpose entity structures and associated 
policy issues for regulators and market participants); Technical Comm., IOSCO, Hedge Funds 
Oversight: Final Report (2009), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf (recommending various principles 
regarding the regulation of hedge funds); Technical Comm., IOSCO, Transparency of Structured 
Finance Products: Consultation Report (2009), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD306.pdf (describing factors for consideration 
regarding the development of ―post-trade transparency‖ for structured finance products). 
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Overall, then, significant progress has been made in core areas relating 
to financial infrastructure and prudential regulation. At the same time, 
despite this level of progress, this analysis suggests that reforms to date 
would still not have been sufficient to prevent the global financial crisis 
and that forward looking reforms are even more limited. If the most 
progress at the international level has been achieved in the context of 
financial infrastructure and prudential regulation, far less has been achieved 
in relation to three other core issues addressed in the following two Parts of 
this Article: macroprudential supervision and regulatory coverage; 
addressing SIFIs, especially G-SIFIs; and financial institution resolution. 
V.  MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY DESIGN 
At the heart of the global financial crisis were two serious failures, 
both relating to the scope and coverage of regulation, domestically, 
regionally, and internationally.115 The first failure was the regulatory gaps, 
overlaps, and divisions in a number of jurisdictions, especially the United 
States, that presented opportunities for regulatory avoidance and arbitrage. 
Combined with a general philosophy of regulatory permissiveness,116 this 
allowed financial institutions to organize their operations to minimize and 
in many cases avoid regulatory scrutiny. At the same time, global markets 
and financial institutions maximized regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
within individual economies and across jurisdictions, with the result being 
that no single regulator had a clear picture of all of the activities and risks 
of any given global financial institution or market despite the attention 
placed on consolidated supervision during the two decades prior to the 
global financial crisis. Moreover, in reality, financial institution 
management in most cases did not have a clear understanding of the scope 
of their own operations, risks, and legal structure.117 These elements have 
 
 115. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 5256, 7580; FIN SERVS. AUTH., 
supra note 1, at 3637; HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE E.U., supra note 1, at 15. 
 116. See generally A. GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW 
WORLD (2007) (describing his approach to financial sector issues as Fed chairman); FCIC, supra 
note 1, at xviii; FIN. SERVS. AGENCY (UK), PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE 
OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (Apr. 2007), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf (describing the UK’s ―high-level‖ and less rules-
oriented approach to financial regulation). 
 117. See, e.g., Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, at 142, In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc., Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), available 
at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/ (―Some [Lehman Brothers’] directors did not recall knowing 
that Lehman had ever been in breach of its risk appetite limits.‖). 
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been brought to light most clearly by the near-failure of AIG and the 
insolvency of Lehman Brothers. Likewise, significant financial markets 
were organized to minimize regulatory scrutiny and interference, resulting 
in a lack of transparency for complex global financial institutions and for 
many of the markets and products in which they dealt. 118  The clearest 
examples were the markets for credit risk transfer such as securitization and 
CDS, with the most extreme example being the pre-crisis shadow banking 
system of conduits, SIVs, and complex structured products. 
The second supervisory failure was the excessive focus of financial 
authorities—finance ministries, central banks, and regulatory agencies—on 
the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions, or 
microprudential supervision. As noted in the previous paragraph, in many 
cases authorities failed even in this responsibility while in addition failing 
to consider linkages across institutions, markets, and products, or 
macroprudential supervision. Macroprudential supervisionfocusing on 
overall market stability and interlinkageswas largely neglected, despite 
increasing numbers of central banks being given or taking on specific 
objectives relating to overall financial stability in the ten years preceding 
the global crisis. 
Two central lessons can be drawn. The first is the necessity of putting 
in place appropriate macroprudential arrangements, domestically and 
regionally. The second is the necessity of reviewing the design of domestic 
and regional regulatory structures to address gaps and reduce the potential 
for regulatory arbitrage. 
A. Macroprudential Supervision 
Following the November 2008 G-20 Declaration that all systemically 
important financial institutions, markets, and instruments would be subject 
to appropriate regulation, in April 2009, the G-20 Financial System 
Declaration provided a much greater level of detail. 119  Specifically, the 
April Declaration included eight aspects. First, regulatory systems should 
be reformed to ensure authorities are able to identify and take account of 
macroprudential risks across the financial system including in the case of 
regulated banks, shadow banks, and private pools of capital to limit the 
build-up of systemic risk, with the FSB, BIS, and international standard-
 
 118. See, e.g., R. Herring & J. Carmassi, The Structure of International Financial 
Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
BANKING (A. Berger et al. eds., 2009). 
 119. G-20, Global Plan, supra note 29. 
ARNER.FPP 4/19/2011  4:12 PM 
2011] GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 133 
 
setters tasked to develop specific macroprudential tools.120 Second, the G-
20 agreed that large and complex financial institutions require particularly 
careful oversight given their systemic importance.121 While seemingly self-
evident, this reflects an important shift in emphasis from the pre-crisis 
period, in which such firms were viewed as better able to address the risks 
they faced than regulators, to the post-crisis period, in which the internal 
risk management systems of large financial institutions will be particularly 
closely monitored by regulators. In support of this, G-20 national regulators 
must have the powers necessary to gather relevant information on all 
material financial institutions, markets, and instruments in order to assess 
the potential for either their failure or severe stress to contribute to systemic 
risk. Beyond traditionally systemically significant firms, the G-20 proposed 
requiring hedge funds or their managers are to be registered and required to 
disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis to supervisors or 
regulators—including leverage—necessary for assessment of the systemic 
risks that they pose individually or collectively. 122  At the same time, 
supervisors will ―require institutions which have hedge funds as their 
counterparties to have effective risk management,‖ including ―mechanisms 
to monitor the funds’ leverage and set limits for single counterparty 
exposures.‖ 123  In relation to credit derivatives, ―standardization and 
resilience of credit derivatives markets, in particular through the 
establishment of central counterparties and clearing arrangements subject 
to effective regulation and supervision‖, will be promoted through working 
in conjunction with industry participants in developing an action plan on 
standardization, with ISDA having taken a particularly active role thus 
far.124  Finally, in relation to keeping pace with future innovation, G-20 
members will ―review and adapt the boundaries of their regulatory 
frameworks regularly to keep pace with developments in the financial 
system and promote good practices and consistent approaches at the 
international level.‖125 
In June 2010, the G-20 tasked the FSB in consultation with the IMF to 
report on recommendations to strengthen both macroprudential and 
microprudential oversight and supervision, ―specifically relating to the 
mandate, capacity and resourcing of supervisors and specific powers‖ to 
 
 120. Id. at 3. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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proactively identify and address risks.126 Further, in November 2010, the G-
20 identified macroprudential supervision as requiring further attention,127 a 
sentiment echoed by the FSB.128 
At this point, despite an increasing amount of attention to the 
subject129 and the fact that there is universal agreement that it is highly 
important, there is in fact little agreement on how actually to go about it. 
B. Designing Effective Regulatory and Supervisory Systems 
Aside from implementing appropriate macroprudential supervision to 
address the scope and coverage of regulation, jurisdictions must evaluate 
the overarching design and structure of the financial regulatory and 
supervisory system. The financial crisis brought into clear focus the 
potential for regulatory arbitrage, and it illustrated the very real need for 
jurisdictions to address the gaps in their regulatory systems that made that 
possible. In the context of the financial stability issues which arose during 
the global financial crisis, given that many issues arose from regulatory 
gaps and divisions, an important aspect is to consider the system in a broad 
and integrated way. 
The global financial crisis has thus demonstrated that the overall 
design and coverage of a regulatory system are vital to its effectiveness. As 
highlighted by the G-20, there is an urgent need to review and enhance the 
scope of regulation, focusing on regulatory design to eliminate gaps and 
implement effective macroprudential financial system oversight. This 
requires a reshaping of regulatory systems so that authorities are able to 
identify and take account of macroprudential risks, with the scope of 
regulation and oversight extending to systemically important financial 
institutions, instruments and markets, including non-bank financial 
institutions. Furthermore, prudential standards must be designed to address 
cross-sectional dimensions (how risk is distributed across a financial 
 
 126. G-20, Toronto Summit, supra note 38, at 5, 17. 
 127. G-20, Seoul Summit, supra note 39, at 3, 910. 
 128. FSB, IMF, & BIS, Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to the G20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, at 1 (Feb. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf.  
 129. See, e.g., Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, Macroprudential PolicyA Literature 
Review 34 (BIS Working Papers No. 337, 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf; Lotte Schou-Zibell et al., A Macroprudential Framework 
for Monitoring and Examining Financial Soundness 12 (ADB Working Paper Series on 
Regional Economic Integration No. 43, 2010), available at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/papers/regional-economic-integration/WP43-Macroprudential-
Monitoring.pdf. 
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system) and time dimensions (how aggregate risk evolves over time) to 
build buffers for use in bad times. 
International consensus and guidance on structural issues has been 
limited, with design being a domestic matter. Following G-20 directions, in 
September 2009, IOSCO released guidance related to unregulated financial 
markets and products.130  In October 2009, the IMF and FSB discussed 
information gaps in regulation, including those resulting from regulatory 
design.131 
Most significantly, in January 2010, the Joint Forum—comprising the 
BCBS, IOSCO, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS)—released an initial review of related issues.132  The Joint Forum 
emphasized four fundamental guiding principles: 
(1)  Similar activities, products, and markets should be subject 
to similar minimum supervision and regulation. 
(2)   Consistency in regulation across sectors is necessary; 
however, legitimate differences can exist across the three 
sectors. 
(3)   Supervision and regulation should consider the risks 
posed, particularly any systemic risk, which may arise not 
only in large financial institutions but also through 
interactions and interconnectedness among institutions of 
all sizes. 
(4)   Consistent implementation of international standards is 
critical to avoid competitive issues and regulatory 
arbitrage.133 
In relation to reducing regulatory differences, the Joint Forum’s 
recommendations included consistency across sectoral financial principles 
(e.g., the BCBS Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision) and 
organizations (e.g., the BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, and IASB); development of 
uniform capital standards for insurance and securities similar to those for 
 
 130. See Technical Comm., IOSCO, Elements of International Regulatory Standards on 
Funds of Hedge Funds Related Issues Based on Best Market Practices: Final Report, at 37 
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD305.pdf. 
 131. IMF & FSB, The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps: Report to the G-20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, at 911 (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102909.pdf. 
 132. The Joint Forum, BCBS et al., Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of 
Financial Regulation: Key Issues and Recommendations, at 12 (Jan. 2010), available at 
http://www.iaisweb.org/_temp/Review_of_the_Differentiated_Nature_and_Scope_of_Financial_
Regulation_January_2010.pdf. 
 133. Id. at 4. 
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banking; development of cross-sectoral standards as necessary (e.g., in 
relation to mortgage origination and credit risk transfer).134 
In relation to financial groups, recommendations focused on ensuring 
that all financial groups, particularly those operating cross-border, are 
subject to comprehensive regulation and supervision on the basis of 
updated international standards addressing conglomerates, and that 
supervisory colleges135 operate consistently across sectors and cross-
sectoral issues are appropriately addressed. 136  Given the central role of 
regulatory gaps and regulatory arbitrage in the global financial crisis, these 
are issues that are likely to be central to future IMF and FSB regulatory 
reviews, in particular concerns that arise in the context of complex 
financial groups of systemic significance. 
At this point, there is no international consensus on which model of 
regulatory structure is best.137 However, there is an important relationship 
among regulatory structure (and attendant financial and human resources), 
financial structure (i.e., the relative importance of banking, insurance, and 
capital markets and the level of financial development), and the structure of 
financial institutions (e.g., strict separation of financial sectors versus 
universal banking). The fundamental issue is how to appropriately tailor an 
economy’s financial regulatory structure to its own circumstances and 
structure for addressing financial intermediary activities and financial 
conglomerates. To the extent that systemically important financial 
institutions, instruments, and markets are unregulated, or opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage exist, the potential risks for future instability increase. 
With this in mind, regulatory structure must be designed to coincide 
with an economy’s financial structure.138  There must be full coverage of 
 
 134. Id. at 1124. 
 135. Supervisory colleges are groupings of individual regulators from the various 
jurisdictions in which a cross-border financial institution operates. The objective is to ensure that 
regulators have a clear picture of the entire operations of a given financial institution and that 
their actions are coordinated to the extent possible. See generally BCBS, Good Practice 
Principles on Supervisory Colleges (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs177.pdf (describing supervisory colleges and the most effective 
ways to implement them). 
 136. Joint Forum, supra note 132 at 1124. 
 137. For a discussion of options in the context of Hong Kong, see Douglas W. Arner et al., 
Financial Regulation in Hong Kong: Time for a Change, 5 ASIAN J. COMP. L., no. 1, 2010 at 1, 
4147.  For discussion of options in the context of the US, see U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 13842 (2008), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf. 
 138. For a full discussion of financial structure, see generally ARNER, supra note 9, 
discussing the fundamental relationship between law, institutional framework of financial 
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the intermediaries (especially financial conglomerates), functions, and risks 
inherent in a given financial system, in such manner that coincides with the 
history, culture, legal system, and level of financial development of that 
economy. An additional risk involves financial structure and regulatory 
design—a potential financial and regulatory mismatch. The risk is that a 
jurisdiction’s financial regulatory structure will not equate with the 
structure of its financial sector; in this author’s opinion, financial 
intermediaries will seek to organize their activities on a basis not 
appropriately addressed by the regulatory structure. In such circumstances, 
it is possible that significant risks may develop through financial 
intermediary operations which are not supervised by the existing structure. 
For example, in a financial system requiring strict separation of financial 
institutions and activity across sectors (e.g., the U.S. Glass–Steagall model), 
informal financial groups may develop that are regulated not on a group 
basis, but rather on a sectoral institutional basis, leaving the financial 
system exposed to the risks of the group. 
Finally, a key issue highlighted in systems in which the regulatory 
functions are separated from the central bank is coordination, especially in 
the context of macroprudential supervision and liquidity provision. In 
economies where these functions are separated, in this author’s opinion, the 
global financial crisis has underlined an absolutely fundamental need for 
robust information-sharing and coordination arrangements, especially in 
times of crisis. 
 
Unlike issues relating to financial infrastructure and prudential 
regulation discussed in Part IV, issues relating to macroprudential 
supervision and overall regulatory design have not yet been significantly 
addressed at the international level. In the context of macroprudential 
supervision, this will likely reflect the fact that, while it is a very good idea 
in theory, this translates into practice with difficulty. In relation to 
regulatory design, G-20 and FSB members have adopted a range of 
differing domestic approaches and any international consensus seems 
unlikely. At the same time, in the context of the FSB and IMF review and 
monitoring process, this must take a central place. 
 
systems, and economic development. 
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VI.  SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION RESOLUTION 
Problems in SIFIs were central to the global financial crisis, as was the 
lack of effective financial institution resolution mechanisms in G-20 
jurisdictions at the time of the global financial crisis. Both are fundamental 
issues for international consideration in the context of reviewing their 
effectiveness in addressing related systemic risks. Following discussion of 
progress in relation to regulation of SIFIs, this Part considers mechanisms 
to address financial institution difficulties in three key areas: liquidity 
arrangements, deposit insurance, and resolution systems. 
A. Addressing SIFIs and G-SIFIs 
SIFIs and G-SIFIs—not only banks but also non-bank financial 
institutions such as investment banks, insurance companies, and the 
shadow banking system—were at the heart of the global financial crisis.139 
Around the world, a key lesson of the crisis is the need for appropriate 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements for such institutions, especially 
large complex global financial institutions, regardless of their form. 
In April 2009, the G-20 established an outline of approaches going 
forward, with the FSB 140  tasked, inter alia, to ―set guidelines for, and 
support the establishment, functioning of, and participation in, supervisory 
colleges, including through ongoing identification of the most systemically 
important cross-border firms.‖ 141  Additionally, the FSB will ―support 
contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with 
respect to systemically important firms,‖142 while continuing ―to support 
continued efforts by the IMF, FSB, World Bank, and BCBS to develop an 
international framework for cross-border bank resolution arrangements.‖143 
The FSB has focused on three aspects: (1) reducing the probability 
and impact of failure through regulation and supervision, (2) improving 
resolution capacity and preparedness, and (3) strengthening core financial 
infrastructure and markets.144 As an initial step, the IMF, BIS, and FSB 
 
 139. See FCIC, supra note 1, at xviii. 
 140. The FSF, at this point, had been reconstituted as the FSF. Press Release, FSF, Financial 
Stability Forum Re-established as the Financial Stability Board (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090402b.pdf. 
 141. G-20 London Summit, supra note 30, at 1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 2. 
 144. FSB, Progress Since the Pittsburgh Summit in Implementing the G20 Recommendations 
for Financial Stability: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Finance Ministers and 
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have developed guidance on assessing the systemic importance of financial 
institutions, markets, and instruments, addressing questions relating to 
systemically important institutions as well as macroprudential 
considerations.145 In addition, the IMF and FSB have analyzed information 
gaps in cross-border institutions and their supervision. 146  Supervisory 
colleges have been the major mechanism to be adopted, with such 
arrangements established for more than thirty large complex financial 
conglomerates and coordinated through the FSB, with similar arrangements 
being developed through European bodies for European systemically 
important financial institutions.147 In addition, institution-specific recovery 
and rapid resolution plans, known as ―living wills‖, are in the process of 
being developed for the identified G-SIFIs.148 
In June 2010, the FSB released an initial report on reducing moral 
hazard risks posed by SIFIs.149 Further, in June 2010, the G-20 tasked the 
FSB to develop recommendations to address problems associated with and 
resolve systemically important financial institutions, including financial 
sector responsibilities for associated costs.150  In October 2010, the FSB 
 
Governors, at 9 (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107a.pdf. 
 145. IMF et al., Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, 
Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, at 2431 (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf. 
 146. IMF & FSB, The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps: Report to the G-20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, at 926 (Oct. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102909.pdf. 
 147. FSB, supra note 144, at 13. The BCBS has developed draft guidance on supervisory 
colleges.  See generally BCBS, Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges (Mar. 2010), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs170.pdf (offering a set of principles supervisory 
colleges should follow to perform effective supervision). Supervisory colleges are groups formed 
of the major regulators of cross-border financial institutions. Id. at 2. The objective is for 
regulators in individual jurisdictions to have an overall understanding of the business and risks of 
the financial institution concerned and to provide a mechanism for dialogue, coordination, and 
cooperation. Id. 
 148. G-20 Toronto Summit, supra note 38, at 18. For full discussion of ―living wills‖ or 
―resolution and recovery plans‖, see generally E. Avgouleas et al., Living Wills as a Catalyst for 
Action (Duisenberg School of Finance, Policy Paper No. 4, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1533808 (describing the benefits of living 
wills for the resolution and insolvency of SIFIs). 
 149. See generally FSB, Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (June 18, 2010) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100627b.pdf (proposing a supervisory 
framework that will reduce moral hazards in financial entities). 
 150. G-20 Toronto Summit, supra note 38, at 5, 18. According to FSB report, guidance is 
built on the following principles: 
1. All jurisdictions should have in place a policy framework to reduce the moral hazard 
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released detailed recommendations and timelines for their 
implementation, 151  endorsed by the G-20 in Seoul. 152  The SIFI 
recommendations contain a very large number of recommendationsfifty-
oneacross six areas, addressing overall framework, G-SIFIs, SIFI 
resolution, SIFI supervision, financial infrastructure, and consistency of 
implementation. 
This central issue, then, is finally progressing, with the SIFI 
recommendations representing a significant consensus with an agreed 
timeline (the end of 2012).153 If implementation is successful, this will mark 
a major milestone and one which would have gone a long way in 
preventing the global financial crisis had it been in place beforehand. At the 
same time, implementation will pose particular challenges in many 
jurisdictions, given that many have concentrated banking systems, with a 
small number of banks dominating most markets.154 Moreover, in many 
jurisdictions, these dominant banks have close connections with the state, 
making any potential problems arising in such institutions both 
 
risks associated with [SIFIs] in their jurisdictions. 
2. All jurisdictions should have effective resolution tools that enable the authorities to 
resolve financial firms without systemic disruptions and without taxpayer losses. . . . 
3. All jurisdictions should have the capacity to impose prudential requirements on firms 
commensurate with their systemic importance. . . . 
4. All national supervisory authorities should have the powers to apply differentiated 
supervision requirements for institutions based on the risk they pose to the financial 
system. 
5. All jurisdictions should put in place or strengthen core financial market infrastructures 
to reduce contagion risk upon a firm’s failure, and encourage their use. 
6. FSB members will establish an ongoing peer review process to promote national 
policies to address the risks associated with SIFIs that are effective in global risk 
reduction, as well as consistent and mutually supportive and thus avoid regulatory 
arbitrage and promote a level playing field. Supervisory colleges and crisis management 
groups will have an important role in seeking to ensure that the legitimate interests of 
home and host authorities are being taken into account and to assist in improving 
cooperation. 
FSB, supra note 149, at 12. 
 151. FSB, Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions: Recommendations and Timelines (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf. 
 152. G-20, Seoul Summit, supra note 39, at 7. 
 153. Id. at 12. 
 154. Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Financial Institutions and Markets Across 
Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis 89 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4943, May 2009).  For the most comprehensive source of data for these conclusions, see 
generally Thorsten Beck et. al, A New Database on Financial Development and Structure (rev. 
Nov. 2010) http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0 (last visited Mar. 23, 2011). 
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economically and politically significant.155 Such dominant and systemically 
important institutions raise not only special concerns for financial stability 
but also in the context of moral hazard, given their significance and 
interconnection, economically and politically. Such issues indicate that 
regulation and supervision, especially of dominant banks in individual 
economies, are of significant and continuing concern, and rate the highest 
level of attention from both domestic regulators and regional cooperative 
mechanisms. 
In the context of SIFIs, especially those with government involvement, 
individual jurisdictions will have to carefully consider the sorts of risks that 
such institutions will be allowed to undertake. Internationally, related 
debate currently centers around the proposal in the United States, known as 
the Volcker Rule, to limit trading activities of banks.156 While it is arguable 
that a Volcker Rule prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary trading 
would not, in fact, have prevented the global financial crisis (and this 
argument in all likelihood even extends as far as the pre-1999 U.S. 
separation between banking and securities in the context of the Glass–
Steagall system), 157  jurisdictions will need to carefully balance the 
sophistication of their major banks and other financial institutions, level of 
development of their markets (especially in terms of cross-sectoral 
activities), effectiveness of their regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
and, most importantly, personnel. 
The global financial crisis has shown not only that domestic 
institutions pose potential systemic risk but also that foreign financial 
institutions—whether banks or otherwisedo as well. Foreign institutions 
 
 155. For bank ownership data and analysis, see J. BARTH ET AL., RETHINKING BANK 
REGULATION: UNTIL ANGELS GOVERN (2005) and supporting database,  J. Barth et al., Bank 
Regulation & Supervision (last updated June 2008),  available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0. 
 156. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Financial Reform (Jan. 
21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-
reform.   
 157.   See generally Martin Mayer, Brookings Inst., Glass-Steagall in our Future: How 
Straight, How Narrow, (unpublished policy brief) (Nov. 2010) (arguing that a direct direct 
relation relationship exists between the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the financial crisis), available 
at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1505488&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1505488; Peter J. Wallison, Am. Enterprise Inst., Did the ―Repeal‖ of Glass-
Steagall Have Any Role in the Financial Crisis? Not Guilty; Not Even Close., (unpublished 
policy brief) (Nov. 2009) (arguing no relation between the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the 
financial crisis), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1507803&rec=1&srcabs=1505488. 
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therefore must also be subject to appropriate regulation and supervision in 
each jurisdiction in which they operate, across regions in which they are 
potentially systemically important, as well as globally. Supervisory 
colleges are an appropriate starting point for such institutions at each level: 
domestic, regional, and international. 
B. Liquidity Arrangements 
Liquidity arrangements were central to addressing the systemic phase 
of the global financial crisis, including domestic measures (especially in the 
United States and United Kingdom), regional measures (through the 
European Central Bank), and international measures (primarily through 
bilateral swap lines from the U.S. Federal Reserve). There is a mixture of 
implicit and explicit structures for liquidity provision, which, prior to the 
crisis, were generally referred to in the context of a lender of last resort. In 
most cases, the lender of last resort is the central bank, but in some cases it 
can be the deposit insurance authority, usually in conjunction with the 
central bank. Under the prevailing pre-crisis formulation, the provision of 
liquidity support in the context of lender of last resort operations generally 
followed the following rules: 
(1) Support should only be provided to temporarily illiquid but 
solvent financial intermediaries. 
(2) Support should be provided freely but at penalty interest. 
(3) Support should be provided to anyone with good collateral who 
meets both rules (1) and (2). 
(4) The lender of last resort should make its readiness to lend ex ante. 
(5) Nonetheless, the decision to provide support should remain 
discretionary. 
(6) This discretion should be based upon the test of the existence of 
potential systemic risk.158 
Based on experiences during the global financial crisis, there was one 
main weakness in this formulation and its operation: although the 
formulation was not explicitly limited to banks, as practiced up to the 
global financial crisis, the general rule applied by central banks operating 
 
 158. ARNER, supra note 9, at 139. 
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as lenders of last resort was to limit the availability of support to 
systemically significant banks. In retrospect, this formulation, when tied to 
the regulatory focus on banks rather than all systemically significant 
institutions and markets, made responses to the initial stages of the crisis 
difficult, especially in the United States. Overall, lender of last resort 
support (perhaps more appropriately: liquidity provider of last resort) needs 
to be available across the financial system to any illiquid but solvent and 
systemically significant financial institution or market. 
Based on experiences during the global financial crisis, it is clear that 
financial authorities should develop appropriate systems of liquidity 
support for financial institutions and the financial system generally. As 
such, the legal foundation for liquidity provision needs to be carefully 
considered in each jurisdiction in the context of regulatory arrangements, 
macroprudential systems, and financial structure. 
C. Deposit Insurance and Investor Protection Arrangements 
Like liquidity arrangements, deposit insurance arrangements have 
been central to addressing systemic issues. Recognizing that existing 
guidance was insufficient, the BCBS and the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers (IADI), which was established in May 2002,159 released an 
extensively revised set of principles for deposit insurance in June of 
2009.160 
Jurisdictions that have put in place blanket guarantees will face initial 
challenges. In these jurisdictions, there is a clear necessity to review 
existing arrangements to identify weaknesses which required the use of the 
blanket guarantee as a backstop during the crisis. Based on experiences in 
the global financial crisis, it is likely that many of these weaknesses 
resulted from inadequate coverage (in both banks and non-bank-financial 
institutions) as well as improperly designed payout systems, in which 
depositors faced long delays in payment, thus incentivizing runs. 161  In 
 
 159. The IADI is hosted by the BIS but is not presently a member of the FSB. 
 160. See BCBS & IADI, Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems, at 25 
(June 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs156.pdf. The standards, comprising 
eighteen principles in ten groups, address: (1) ―[s]etting objectives‖ (principles 1–2); (2) 
―[m]andates and powers‖ (principles 3–4); (3) ―[g]overnance‖ (principle 5); (4) ―[r]elationships 
with other safety-net participants and cross-border issues‖ (principles 6–7); (5) ―[m]embership 
and coverage‖ (principles 8–10); (6) ―[f]unding‖ (principle 11); (7) ―[p]ublic awareness‖ 
(principle 12); (8) ―[s]elected legal issues‖ (principles 13–14); (9) ―[f]ailure resolution‖ 
(principles 15–16); and (10) ―[r]eimbursing depositors and recoveries‖ (principles 17–18). Id. at 
25. 
 161. See William Buiter, The Lessons from Northern Rock, FIN. TIMES ECONOMISTS’ FORUM 
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moving from blanket guarantees to improved defined coverage systems, 
jurisdictions can maximize understanding and thereby effectiveness by 
focusing not only on the design of the system, but also on communicating 
the removal of the guarantee and disseminating details of the system. 
Other jurisdictions still maintain implicit guarantees—often in the 
financial systems with large, systemically important and, in some cases, 
government-connected banks and other financial institutions. Such 
jurisdictions should carefully review their safety net design in the context 
of reviewing regulatory and supervisory arrangements for systemically 
significant financial institutions (discussed above). In this context, there is 
a need for careful balancing of reality (large financial institutions will often 
not be allowed to fail) and real moral hazard risks. In jurisdictions where 
large financial institutions are unlikely to be allowed to fail under any 
circumstances, the corollary is that the risks that these institutions 
undertake must be strictly limited. At the same time, even in the context of 
the largest financial institutions, having in place an explicit system of 
deposit insurance and other compensation arrangements for financial 
institution customers (especially insurance customers) has the potential to 
enhance incentives of management and reduce moral hazard. 
D. Financial Institution Resolution Arrangements 
Overall, it is clear that the systemic phase of the current global 
financial crisis was triggered by the failure of large complex global 
financial conglomerates. As recognized by the G-20, one of the greatest 
failures of both international and domestic legal and regulatory systems has 
been the lack of appropriate arrangements, including adequate insolvency 
arrangements, to address such failures when they occur.162 Following the 
difficulties experienced in dealing with the failure or near-failure of large 
complex global financial conglomerates such as Lehman Brothers and AIG, 
the central approach is a framework based upon prevention of failure as the 
first element and mechanisms to address failure when they occur as the 
second. 
 In the context of financial institution resolution arrangements, the 
most significant element is the increased focus on mechanisms to address 
failure of financial institutions operating on a cross-border basis—a 
problem that is not easy to solve and one which is likely to require 
 
(Nov. 13, 2007, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2007/11/the-lessons-frohtml/.  
 162. See Part II supra, especially Tables 1 & 2. 
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significant time and effort before a workable approach is reached.163 In 
response to the G-20 mandate to address this issue, the FSF released the 
most significant attempt to date to address issues of failure resolution.164 In 
this set of principles, the FSF stated ―[t]he objective of financial crisis 
management is to seek to prevent serious domestic or international 
financial instability that would have an adverse impact on the real 
economy‖. 165  At the same time, the FSF recognized that such financial 
crisis management ―remains a domestic competence,‖ albeit one requiring 
cross-border cooperation.166 
In relation to preparation, authorities are to 
[d]evelop common support tools for managing a cross-border 
financial crisis, including these principles: a key data list; a common 
language for assessing systemic implications (drawing on those 
developed by the [EU] and by national authorities); a document that 
authorities can draw on when considering together the specific issues 
that may arise in handling severe stress at specific firms; and an 
experience library, which pools key lessons from different crises.167 
In addition, supervisors will meet at least annually through the college 
framework, 168  share a range of information on large complex financial 
institutions, 169  and ensure that firms have internal contingency plans in 
place.170 
In managing financial crises, authorities are to 
[s]trive to find internationally coordinated solutions that take account 
of the impact of the crisis on the financial systems and real 
economies of other countries, drawing on information, arrangements, 
and plans developed ex-ante. These coordinated solutions will most 
likely be mainly driven by groups of authorities of the most directly 
involved economies.171 
 
 163. See Douglas Arner & Joseph Norton, Building a Framework to Address Failure of 
Complex Global Financial Institutions, 39 HONG KONG L. J. 95, 11213 (2009). 
 164. See Press Release, FSF, Financial Stability Forum Issues Recommendations and 
Principles to Strengthen Financial Systems, 1 (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://www.bis.org/press/p090403b.pdf. 
 165. Id. at 11. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1112. 
 170. Id.at 12. 
 171. Id. 
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In June 2010, G-20 leaders committed to ―design and implement a 
system where we have the powers and tools to restructure or resolve all 
types of financial institutions in crisis, without taxpayers ultimately bearing 
the burden. 172  Leaders endorsed the recommendations of the BCBS on 
cross-border bank resolution, 173  stating that resolution regimes should 
provide for174 
1)proper allocation of losses to reduce moral hazard and protect 
taxpayers; 
2)continuity of critical financial services, including 
uninterrupted service for insured depositors; 
3)credibility of the resolution regime in the market; 
4)minimization of contagion; 
5)advanced planning for orderly resolution and transfer of 
contractual relationships; and 
6)effective cooperation and information exchange domestically 
and among jurisdictions in the event of a failure of a cross-
border institution. 
The recent pronouncements from the G-20 and FSB are a very useful 
start, especially in relation to regulation, supervision and contingency 
planning for financial institution failure. However, the statements, reports, 
and principles, while recognizing the problems raised by such failures, 
largely leave actual resolution to domestic authorities. This suggests that in 
the final analysis, individual jurisdictions will have to carefully consider 
their own arrangements with respect to the potential failure of a large 
complex financial institution operating within their jurisdiction and to take 
appropriate precautionary actions ex ante. Unfortunately, even in the wake 
of the global financial crisis, while it may be possible to develop adequate 
international arrangements relating to prevention of financial institution 
failure, there is still insufficient consensus with respect to actual insolvency 
arrangements for any international framework to emerge at present. In such 
 
 172. G-20, Pittsburgh Leaders’ Statement, supra note 37, at 5, 17. 
 173. BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group: Final 
Paper, at 1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf. The ten 
recommendations address (1) ―[e]ffective national resolution powers‖; (2) ―frameworks for 
coordinated resolution of financial groups‖; (3) ―[c]onvergence of national resolution 
mechanisms‖; (4) ―[c]ross-border effects of national resolution mechanisms‖; (5) ―[r]eduction of 
complexity and interconnectedness of group structures and operations‖; (6) ―[p]lanning in 
advance for orderly resolution‖; (7) ―[c]ross-border cooperation and information sharing‖; (8) 
―[s]trengthening risk mitigation mechanisms‖; (9) ―[t]ransfer of contractual relationships‖; and 
(10) ―[e]xit strategies and market discipline.‖ 
 174. G-20, Toronto Summit, supra note 38, at 1718. 
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a context, individual jurisdictions must act proactively in building 
preventive arrangements based on internationally agreed upon approaches. 
At the same time, there is likely to be a continued lack of arrangements to 
deal with actual insolvencies of large complex financial institutions at the 
international level. Individual jurisdictions should thus separately mandate 
capitalized subsidiaries that are subject to domestic insolvency 
arrangements for global firms appropriate for the activities being engaged 
in the individual jurisdiction. At present this is the only arrangement 
capable to some extent of limiting the damage in individual jurisdictions 
resulting from the failure of large complex cross-border financial 
institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a question: has the post-crisis international 
financial regulatory reform agenda met its minimum objective of putting in 
place an agreement on the necessary elements to prevent and address the 
systemic risks which arose in the global financial crisis? In seeking to 
answer this question, this Article has reviewed the agenda set by the G-20 
and developed by the FSB and its constituents. 
At the outset, the agenda largely parallels the agreed causes of the 
global financial crisis and the necessary elements of regulation to address 
systemic risk. In addition, there has in fact been a great deal of work and 
progress on agreeing international approaches to major post-crisis 
regulatory issues. At the same time, it is clear that despite its claims of 
having established the ―core elements of a new financial regulatory 
framework to transform the global financial system‖175 at its most recent 
leaders’ summit in Seoul, South Korea, in November 2010, that the G-20 
and the FSB have not been entirely successful in meeting this minimum 
test. Adaptation, therefore, to date has not yet been sufficient to establish 
future resilience. 
First, while there has been significant progress in addressing financial 
infrastructure, prudential regulation, and regulation of SIFIs and G-SIFIs, 
there has been much less progress in relation to macroprudential 
supervision, regulatory design and coverage, and resolution of financial 
institutionsall core crisis issues. Second, in relation to the central issue 
relating to financial infrastructureOTC derivatives marketsthere has 
been significant agreement on the way forward and one which may in fact 
 
 175. G-20, Seoul Summit, supra note 39, at 7.  
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ultimately prove sufficient to have prevented the crisis. Only time will tell, 
with it still being possible at this time that markets will not change 
fundamentally from their pre-crisis structure and that significant systemic 
risk will remain. Third, in relation to the fundamental prudential 
issuescapital, liquidity, and leveragewhile there has been very 
significant progress in relation to capital and to a lesser extent liquidity, 
leverage requirements remain to be dealt with and these are in fact central 
to the effectiveness of the capital and liquidity requirements. 
Going beyond the minimum requirement of policies sufficient to have 
prevented the last crisis, post-crisis international regulatory efforts to date 
have been far less successful in meeting the real desire: putting in place a 
financial regulatory system which is able to address future crises. At this 
point, with the limited exception of regulation of hedge funds, the G-20 and 
the FSB have yet to move towards a more forward looking approach. This 
certainly must be the objective over the coming years. 
 
